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SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION
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Although the School Ethics Commission (SEC) does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the School Ethics Act (SEA), there are good reasons why the Superior Court should not make the initial determination in school ethics matter. As the Superior Court may not be familiar with the SECs rulings, the result may be inconsistent with those rulings, creating uncertainty in the educational community.
This controversy centers around school ethics in the context of the Interdistrict Public School Choice Act (the Choice Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:36B-1 et seq. The Choice Act permits students to attend designated schools outside their district of residence free of charge. In September 2003, the Washington Township Board of Education (Board) voted to cap at 2% the number of students who could leave the district to participate in the Choice program, and gave no preference to siblings already in the program. Subsequently, a board members child submitted a notice that she wished to apply for the lottery. Previously, the board member had no children in the program. The district had never enforced its 2% cap but had previously given a preference to students with siblings already in the choice program. The Board now believed that it was in its best interests to enforce the cap without a sibling preference. At a meeting held in October 2003 the board member participated in discussions and deliberations pertaining to the enforcement of the 2% limitation that had been approved at the September meeting, which discussions culminated in a decision not to change the 2% cap.
Parents who had siblings in the choice school, sought reversal of the Boards action in Superior Court, Law Division. They alleged that the board member who had a daughter who applied to the program had a personal involvement that created a conflict of interest under N.J.S.A. 18A: 12-24c of the SEA. The Superior Court sided with the parents and ruled that the board member had a conflict of interest when she participated in discussions in October. The judge ordered the Board to conduct a revote at an emergency meeting on November 24, with the member excluded. The meeting was held on an emergency basis to meet deadlines set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:12-4.3c, requiring that the Board notify the parents of the students selected.
The Board filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Board had argued that reconsideration was warranted because the Court had primary jurisdiction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 and a number of established legal rulings. However, the judge determined that, given the emergent nature of the dispute, the Superior Court was best able to make determinations in this matter. The Board had also asserted that, according to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(h), a board member may vote on everyday decisions even though the board members child may be affected in some tangential way. That provision provides that:
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No school official shall be deemed in conflict with these provisions if, by reason of his participation in any matter required to be voted upon, no material or monetary gain accrues to him as a member of any business, profession, occupation or group, to any greater extent than any gain could reasonably be expected to accrue to any other member of that business, profession, occupation or group;
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The Board relied on an SEC decision, McGavin v. Anthony, C11-00 (12/19/00) and SEC Advisory Opinion A-01-98 (2/27/98), which recognize that under section (h), a board member is not disqualified from participating in a decision if that decision will affect every member of a group, e.g., every parent of a student in the district. The SECs reasoning is that to disqualify a board member from voting on such issues would require disqualification on so many issues that a board member would be prevented from fulfilling his duties, and school boards throughout the state could be paralyzed. However, the Judge ruled against the Board, relying instead on cases applied by the courts in non school-related conflicts. The Judge rejected the Boards arguments that by virtue of provision (h) cited above, the SEC requires more lenient standards to conflicts arising under the school laws than those applied in non-school related conflicts; and that unless a board member has a tangible reward at stake he cannot be deemed as having a conflict. The Court also determined that principles of statutory construction weighed against the Boards interpretation of section (h), finding that the section only applied to groups that had an underlying commercial purpose, and would not apply to parents of students. Finally, the Judge found that even if (h) were defined as the Board argued, the board member still violated the SEA as her child was the member of a discrete group of ten students, of which only three could go to the choice school. Therefore, she had a material interest in the outcome of the deliberations, in particular whether the District would continue to afford preference to applicants who had siblings already enrolled. The Judge ruled that her participation in the deliberations regarding the issue required the Board to reconsider the issue and revote in her absence.
The Board appealed to the Appellate Division. The NJSBA joined the case as amicus curiae, lending support to the Boards argument that the trial court erred when it failed to defer and in fact gave no consideration to the SECs decisions interpreting N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(h), as the SEC was the administrative agency charged by the Legislature with enforcement of the SEA. NJSBA asserted that, at the very least, the Appellate Division should remand back to the trial court with instructions to consider the decisions of the SEC in its ethics determination, if not transfer the ethics matter to the SEC in its entirety.
Oral argument was held on this matter in November 2004. The parties await decision.
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