Commissioner of Education
Noteworthy May Decisions
Docket No. 156-26 (May 6, 2026). While D.E. – a tenth grade student who is “Sunni Muslim” and identifies as an Egyptian and an Arab – was working on a group project, A1 “suddenly” asked D.E. to which sect of Islam she belonged. After D.E. responded, “Sunni,” A1 allegedly replied, “Good, because all Shia are terrorists.” A1 also allegedly said “there was no Palestine.” Although A1 knew that D.E. was Muslim and the two had previously discussed the Mideast conflict together (despite not being “friends”), D.E. was offended by A1’s response/comments, and felt that A1 was targeting Muslims.
The Anti-Bullying Specialist (ABS) determined that the conduct met the definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB), but the superintendent overturned the ABS’s determination because and there was a lack of evidence (following interviews with other students) to confirm D.E.’s claims about what A1 allegedly said.
On appeal, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the board’s decision was made in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. In reaching this decision, the ALJ found: “[a] discussion of the Israel-Hamas conflict or whether Palestine is a country is, on its face, political”; there was no credible evidence or proof that A1 said “All Shia are terrorists” or “All Muslims are terrorists”; A1 asking D.E. what sect of Islam she was a member of was a question about her religion on school property did not constitute HIB.
The Commissioner of Education (COE) concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the board’s HIB determination was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Docket No. 157-26R (May 6, 2026). Petitioner alleged that the board’s investigation of a HIB incident was not conducted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (ABR) and, therefore, denied her due process.
At the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), the ALJ granted summary decision in favor of the board, and found that petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because she was not challenging respondent’s ultimate determination that HIB did not occur, but rather the board’s failure to comply with the ABR’s procedural requirements.
The COE remanded the matter to the OAL because summary decision was not appropriate, as “material facts are contested regarding whether the HIB investigation was conducted in accordance with the [ABR].” The COE also disagreed with the ALJ’s determination that petitioner cannot challenge the board’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the procedural requirements of the ABR for conducting an investigation. However, the COE agreed with the ALJ that monetary damages were not an available remedy under the ABR for any such violation(s).
Docket No. 164-26 (May 15, 2026). Petitioner began working in the district in 2003 and acquired tenure as a principal and as a supervisor, most recently holding the position of Supervisor of Safety and Student Services.
Following a medical leave, petitioner requested accommodations that would restrict him from lifting anything greater than 30 pounds, breaking up fights, and restraining students. On August 26, 2024, the board transferred petitioner from Supervisor of Safety and Student Services to assistant principal of a middle school, but did not change his salary. Petitioner challenged the involuntary transfer.
The ALJ concluded that the board’s involuntary transfer of petitioner from the Supervisor of Safety and Student Services position to assistant principal violated his tenure rights because: the transfer was not consensual; petitioner’s request for an accommodation was not implied consent to a transfer or a waiver of his tenure rights; and the board transferred petitioner to another position entirely – it was not a transfer to another assignment within his position. The COE concurred with the ALJ’s legal conclusions, adopted the initial decision as the final decision, and ordered the board to reinstate petitioner to a supervisor position in accordance with his tenure rights.
Docket No. 165-26 (May 15, 2026). Petitioner, a transportation company, challenged the decision of respondents, the board and the Educational Services Commission, to reject its bid in response to an advertisement for transportation routes in order to “loo[k] for better pricing,” even though petitioner was the lowest bidder.
The ALJ explained that the board had the authority to reject “any and all bids” under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-5 and N.J.A.C. 6A:27-9.8(b) and, here, the board rejected all the bids pursuant to that authority and rebid the routes to look for better pricing. Petitioner did not file a petition to challenge the original bid specifications or the rebid. Based on the above, the ALJ concluded, and the COE concurred, that petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, warranting the dismissal of the petition.
Docket No. 174-26 (May 26, 2026). The district issued a one-day detention for L.G.’s possession of a vape, which also resulted in a four-game suspension from baseball because it was his second vaping infraction. Petitioner challenged the discipline and argued that the district’s Student Code of Conduct, Substance Abuse Policy, and Athletic Code of Conduct were unconstitutional and violated New Jersey statutes and regulations, and parental rights, particularly by mandating drug testing without parental consent.
The ALJ concluded that the district’s disciplinary actions had a rational basis and the district’s policies complied with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. Addressing the parental-consent argument, the ALJ emphasized that parental consent (or refusal to consent) does not trump the board’s exercise of authority under the statutes and regulations that require drug testing when a student is suspected of being under the influence of illegal substances.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board’s disciplinary actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and dismissed the petition.
Docket No. 183-26 (May 29, 2026). Petitioner challenged the board’s decision that an incident during which the board/administration played a video of him and his daughter (neither of whom were identified or mentioned in the video) at a board meeting as part of a presentation regarding bus safety (the video demonstrated an unsafe action taken by petitioner, although his face was unrecognizable at all times) did not meet the definition of HIB.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision and dismissed the petition of appeal, finding that petitioner did not sustain his burden in establishing that the board’s determination that the incident did not meet the definition of HIB was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The ALJ highlighted that there was no evidence: that the conduct was directed at Z.S. or motivated by her special education status; or that the video harmed Z.S. or substantially disrupted her school environment. The COE concurred with the ALJ’s conclusion and affirmed the dismissal of the appeal.
Docket No. 185-26E (May 29, 2026). Petitioner is the district’s assistant superintendent and her job description includes the requirement to serve as the acting superintendent in the absence of the superintendent. On March 23, 2026, the board placed the superintendent on administrative leave and appointed another employee (not petitioner) to the position of acting superintendent. Petitioner filed a motion for emergent relief, seeking appointment as the acting superintendent.
Although finding that petitioner established two of the four prongs required to prevail on a motion for emergent relief (well-settled legal right and likelihood of success on the merits), the ALJ denied the application because petitioner did not demonstrate irreparable harm or that her hardship outweighed the hardship to the board, as any potential damages could be rectified monetarily. The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner did not satisfy all four prongs required for emergent relief, and adopted the ALJ’s order denying the application.
Docket No. 186-26E (May 29, 2026). Following an incident during which a custodian gave his child rubber gloves in the cafeteria, petitioner requested to view surveillance footage related to this incident. A district representative showed petitioner the recordings, but, at some point thereafter, the video of the ingress and egress areas of the cafeteria was erased during the normal course of the district’s video retention system.
Petitioner filed a request for emergent relief, seeking to compel the board to produce surveillance footage and an investigation file regarding the incident. The board explained that there is no video recording available to produce to petitioner, nor is there an investigation file, as the principal only had an informal discussion with the custodian following the incident.
The ALJ concluded that petitioner did not demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm and denied the request for emergent relief. The COE concurred that petitioner was not entitled to emergent relief and affirmed the denial of his request.
School Ethics Commission
Decisions Adopted On May 26, 2026
Docket No. C67-25. Respondent is employed by the Township Police Department (police department) as a “Building Security/Motor Pool Coordinator.” Despite his employment with the police department, and despite earning more than $2,000.00, respondent failed to disclose this employment on his 2025 disclosure statements (Count 2). After the board’s Finance Committee, of which respondent is a member, approved a “bill list” which included two separate payments ($1,188.00 and $1,956.00) to the Township for “Special Police Services,” respondent voted to approve these payments (to his employer) at a public board meeting (Count 3).
The School Ethics Commission (SEC) found, by way of summary decision, that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-26(a)(1) (Count 2) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) (Count 3), and recommended a penalty of reprimand.
Docket No. C113-25. Complainant submits that respondent used her “public school office and position as Board President” to influence a friend’s election to a board of education in a neighboring school district in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g). More specifically, complainant submits that, through an op-ed and her (respondent’s) social media account, respondent acted in her official capacity to publicly endorse her “friend” for a seat on the board of education (but not for the board on which respondent serves), and also referred to complainant – who was running against respondent’s friend – as a liar and a person who misleads the public.
Although the SEC determined that respondent’s social media posts were not offered in her official capacity as a board member, but that a reasonable member of the public could perceive that respondent’s op-ed was offered in her official capacity as a board member, the SEC declined to find probable cause for the allegations in the complaint because there was insufficient factual evidence offered in support thereof. The SEC also declined to find the complaint frivolous, and to impose sanctions.
Docket No. C125-25. According to complainant, the named respondent – the Board President – violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (c), (d), (e), and (g) because she unilaterally created an unauthorized ad hoc committee (the Hall of Fame Ad Hoc Committee) before the board authorized or otherwise approved its creation; released event materials without board approval; “allowed unauthorized public communication” about the ad hoc committee; and withheld financial information regarding the unilaterally created and unauthorized ad hoc committee.
The SEC dismissed, in part, certain allegations in Count 1 as untimely, but declined to find probable cause for all other timely filed claims. The SEC also declined to find the complaint frivolous and to impose sanctions.
Docket No. C126-25. Per complainant, the Board President unilaterally created and operated an ad hoc committee (the Hall of Fame Ad Hoc Committee) for several months in 2025, and did so without fully informing the board (including complainant, a former board member), without a board motion, and without a board vote on whether to create the ad hoc committee as required by board policy. Complainant further submits that the named respondent – the superintendent – was aware that this unilaterally created ad hoc committee existed, but failed to stop its “unauthorized activities”; allowed the committee’s unauthorized activities to be presented publicly; failed to ensure “proper financial oversight” of the committee; and “allowed district resources and communication systems [i.e., email] to be used for an unauthorized program.” Based on respondent’s failures to stop, oversee, or otherwise monitor the unauthorized ad hoc committee, complainant argues that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f).
The SEC did not find probable cause for the claimed violations of the School Ethics Act (the Act), and emphasized that the formation and governance of board committees falls under the jurisdiction of the board, and the superintendent does not administer the board. Because complainant was “well aware” that the superintendent does not have control over the formation or governance of board committees, the SEC found the complaint frivolous, and imposed a fine of $100.00.
Docket No. C127-25. By way of background, complainant – a teacher and district employee – filed an ethics complaint against the district’s superintendent in April 2025 (SEC Docket No. C29-25). At a board meeting in October 2025, which was after the previously filed ethics complaint was filed but before it was dismissed, respondent made statements at a public board meeting that defamed and chastised complainant for filing the complaint (which he describes as “timely” and “legitimate”). By making disparaging and denigrating statements about him, and disclosing the existence of the ethics complaint at a time when it was still pending, complainant contends that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (c), (e), (i), and (j).
The SEC did not find probable cause for the claimed violations of the Act because complainant did not produce sufficient factual evidence to substantiate a violation(s).
Docket No. C129-25. While seated at the dais during a public board meeting, the named respondent/the Board President “made statements” which, according to complainant, contained “false information” about him. Generally, respondent’s statements indicated that complainant “infiltrated” a neighboring board of education; the neighboring board of education is now a “@hit show”; and complainant “had a big role in flipping” the neighboring board of education. By making these statements, complainant argues that respondent made decisions based on personal animus; did not consider the educational welfare of children; compromised the board; and did not support the interests of the public in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), (f), and (i).
The SEC declined to find probable cause for the stated violations of the Act because complainant failed to produce sufficient factual evidence in support of a violation(s).
Docket No. C132-25. The superintendent filed an ethics complaint against the business administrator/board secretary and argued that he violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a), (b), (c), and (d) when he retained a board member to serve as his real estate agent in connection with the purchase of his home in August-September 2024.
Because complainant had “been aware” of the business arrangement between the board member and respondent since August 2024 (when it was discussed at a board retreat in his presence), the SEC found that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances warranting the relaxation of the applicable period of limitations, the complaint was not timely filed and, therefore, was administratively dismissed.
New Public Advisory Opinions
A09-26. A board member owns a private business, out of the district, which offers full-day kindergarten services. Per the requestor, the board is scheduled to vote on a budget that, for the very first time, will include implementation of full-day kindergarten. The requestor inquires whether the board member must recuse from the board’s vote on the budget, and whether they must recuse from subsequent staffing and program decisions that may influence the success and competitiveness of the district’s full-day kindergarten program.
The SEC advised that the board member is not prohibited from voting on the board’s budget simply because they own a private business, in a neighboring town, that offers full-day kindergarten services, and is not prohibited from participating in general staffing and program decisions related to the district’s implementation of full-day kindergarten; however, if a person employed by the board member’s private business applies for a position in the district, the board member should then recuse from those discussions and votes.
A10-26. A board member asked whether the Board President, because of their long-standing professional/personal relationship with the superintendent, as well as their outspoken public support for the superintendent, was required to recuse from matters related to the superintendent (including in connection with a current board investigation/forensic investigation into alleged misconduct).
The SEC declined to answer several broad questions about conflicts, bias, and appearances of impropriety because the requestor did not inquire whether certain prospective conduct would violate a specific provision of the Act. However, the SEC did advise that the Board President was not required to recuse from the investigation, personnel matters involving the superintendent, or from the superintendent’s evaluation. The SEC explained that expressing support for a superintendent, without additional facts showing an inability to act objectively or independently, does not create a conflict of interest or require recusal. Per the SEC, “Support and/or lack thereof, without more, does not create a per se conflict.”
A11-26. The SEC considered whether a board member had a conflict of interest because their brother-in-law provides consulting services to a law firm/attorney that was being considered for appointment as the board’s solicitor.
The SEC determined that the board member was not required to recuse from discussions or the vote on the board’s solicitor because their brother-in-law was not an employee or owner of the firm, would not work on board-related matters, and there was no identifiable financial interest/entanglement. However, the SEC advised that if the brother-in-law consults on a matter involving the board in the future, then the board member would need to recuse from the discussions and votes on those matters.
A12-26. Board counsel inquired whether a board member, whose spouse recently retired from in-district employment, could continue serving on the board’s Finance Committee.
The SEC advised that the board member is not prohibited from continuing to serve on the board’s Finance Committee, especially since the board member’s spouse is now retired. Nonetheless, should a matter concerning the board member’s spouse’s employment and/or retirement benefits come before the Finance Committee, the board member would then need to recuse the discussion and/or the vote related to same.
*For further information about these matters, please contact the NJSBA Legal Department at (609) 278-5279, or your board attorney for formal legal advice.
