Commissioner of Education
Noteworthy July Decisions
Docket No. 247-26 (July 15, 2026). Petitioner appealed the board’s determination that she and her six minor children were not domiciled in the district. After the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), petitioner failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. Following petitioner’s abandonment of her appeal, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing to address the board’s counterclaim for tuition. Following testimony, the ALJ concluded that petitioner owed $250,329.25 in tuition for the 2024-2025 and 2025-2026 school years, and this amount included the cost of special education placement tuition for two of the minor children.
Upon review, the Commissioner of Education (COE) concurred with the ALJ that petitioner abandoned her appeal and failed to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that she was domiciled in the district during the 2024-2025 and 2025-2026 school years and, therefore, owed tuition to the district. However, the COE rejected the ALJ’s method of calculating the tuition owed by petitioner and concluded that the total tuition owed is $152,523.60, not $250,329.25, because an individual student’s special education costs must be excluded from the calculation. As noted by the COE, “The statute does not specify that the assessed tuition be equal to the actual costs incurred by the district for educating the student at issue. Instead, it uses the measure of annual per pupil cost, which is based on the district’s overall costs and enrollment and is not specific to any individual student.”
Docket No. 253-26SEC (July 17, 2026). The named respondent in C67-25 neither filed exceptions to the recommended penalty of reprimand, nor instituted an appeal of the School Ethics Commission’s (SEC) finding that he violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-26(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c).
The COE concurredwith the SEC’s recommended penalty of reprimand.
Docket No. 254-26E (July 17, 2026). After the board adopted a budget that eliminated courtesy busing for non-remote students, petitioners filed a petition of appeal and motion for emergent relief.
The ALJ denied petitioners’ request for emergent relief because they failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and because the legal right underlying their claim was settled against their (petitioners’) position. Per the ALJ, the statute which permits boards to provide courtesy busing, N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1.1, does not require boards to provide transportation for non-remote students who may live along a hazardous route when courtesy busing is not otherwise provided. The ALJ also found that the board was not required to conduct a hazardous route analysis prior to eliminating courtesy busing for non-remote students.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioners failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief.
Docket No. 255-26E (July 17, 2026). After V.P., a homeschooled student, was denied participation in the district’s Electricity Program because V.P. failed to submit all required documentation, petitioner filed a petition of appeal and motion for emergent relief.
Although V.P. satisfied the first prong of entitlement to emergent relief (irreparable harm), the ALJ found that petitioner could not satisfy the second prong (the legal right underlying petitioner’s claim) because unless a school’s action is arbitrary, capricious, without a rational basis, or induced by improper motives, its decision to deny a student participation in a vocational program because of an incomplete application is valid. The ALJ also found that V.P. could not satisfy the third (likelihood of success on the merits) or the fourth prong (balancing of equities and interests of justice) of entitlement to emergent relief. Because “there are no further disputes to be resolved,” the ALJ concluded that the petition should be dismissed.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioners failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief. However, the COE found that the ALJ’s dismissal of the petition of appeal was not appropriate as part of an order on emergent relief; therefore, the COE rejected that portion of the ALJ’s decision, and directed the matter to continue at the OAL until the matter was fully resolved.
Docket No. 264-26 (July 22, 2026). Following an appeal of the SEC’s February 18, 2025, decision (Docket Nos. C64-22, C77-22, and C92-22 (Consolidated)), the COE concurred with the SEC that appellants violated the School Ethics Act (Act) when they: voted to authorize appellant S. to file an ethics complaint against another board member, and for the board’s counsel to draft the charges; and voted against a motion to strike the resolution that would have required appellant S. to obtain separate legal counsel to pursue the ethics complaint. The COE specifically agreed that: appellant S. violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), (c), and (f); all appellants violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), (e), and (f); and the penalty of censure was appropriate for all appellants due to the public nature of their actions.
The COE also emphasized that the Act and its accompanying regulations bar boards of education from filing ethics complaints because only a “person” may file an ethics complaint. The COE explained, “[i]f appellants wished to address the other board member’s alleged misconduct, they were free to bring ethics charges against her in their individual capacities while represented by their own legal counsel, not the board’s.”
Docket No. 270-26 (July 27, 2026). A.V. reported, and multiple witnesses confirmed, that M.H., who she previously dated: 1) loudly accused A.V., during class, of engaging in sexual activity; 2) displayed photos of A.V. to his male peers; 3) spoke loudly about A.V. to his friends so that she could overhear him; 4) spread rumors about A.V. to socially isolate her; and 5) photographed A.V. during class without her consent. The board approved the anti-bullying specialist’s (ABS) conclusion that M.H.’s conduct met the definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB) “as it [was] motivated by an actual characteristic of gender and other distinguishing characteristic as the victim was a target due to a former relationship with the offender.”
The ALJ granted petitioners’ cross-motion for summary decision and reversed the board’s determination that M.H. committed an act of HIB, noting that “no reasonable person could conclude that M.H.’s actions were motivated by A.V.’s gender and not her status as his ex-romantic partner.” The ALJ also rejected the board’s designation of the former relationship as an additional distinguishing characteristic because “a breakdown in a relationship between two students is peer conflict, and therefore does not constitute a distinguishing characteristic.”
The COE found that the ALJ “improperly substituted his own judgment for that of the board” and “overlook[ed] the [b]oard’s properly supported finding that A.V.’s gender was a motivating characteristic,” thereby “fail[ing] to afford the [b]oard’s decision the proper deference.” Because the record justified why the board concluded that the definition of HIB was met, the COE affirmed the board’s determination that M.H. committed an act of HIB.
Docket No. 271-26 (July 27, 2026). A female student, L.A., reported that B.B. called her “board game.” L.A. did not know what the term meant until another student explained that it referred to her being flat in the front and rear areas of her body. The administration determined that B.B. committed an act of HIB, which the board affirmed after a hearing, and petitioner appealed.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision and dismissed the petition of appeal. The ALJ found that petitioner did not demonstrate that the board’s HIB decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The ALJ also specifically explained that a reasonable fourteen-year-old girl would perceive that being called a “board game” was based upon the distinguishing characteristics of her gender and physical appearance, and emphasized that, “[t]he fact that L.A. did not initially know what the term meant does not invalidate this.”
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner did not meet her burden in demonstrating that the board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably when it determined that her son, B.B., committed an act of HIB.
Docket No. 272-26 (July 27, 2026). Petitioners provided text messages to the district that they believe constituted HIB against their child, H.C. The district representative who conducted the HIB investigation concluded that the HIB allegation: was unfounded; did not have a substantial impact on H.C.’s rights; and appeared to be a part of a mutual conflict between the students. The superintendent and the board agreed, and petitioners appealed the board’s decision.
In granting the board’s motion for summary decision and dismissing the petition, the ALJ found that the board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably when it determined that the conduct towards H.C. did not constitute an act of HIB.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner when it determined that petitioners’ child was not the victim of an act of HIB.
Docket No. 276-26 (July 29, 2026). Petitioners, teachers employed by the board, requested to use their accrued sick time to attend their children’s school events. Specifically, petitioner Auxter sought to attend her child’s in-class “legacy presentation,” and petitioner Boyle sought to attend her child’s “School Holiday Sing” (a “concert for parents”). When the board denied their requests, petitioners appealed.
Following cross-motions for summary decision, the ALJ concluded that a plain reading of N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1(a) dictates that petitioners should have been permitted to use their accrued sick time to attend their children’s school-related events. In granting petitioner’s motion, the ALJ found that both the “legacy presentation” and school concert were “functions or other events” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1(a), and that both petitioners were both “properly invited by school staff members.”
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the sick leave statute permits an employee’s attendance at a school-related event like a student presentation or concert, and that both petitioner Auxter and petitioner Boyle should have been permitted to use their accrued sick leave time to attend these events.
Docket No. 277-26 (July 29, 2026). L.S. admitted that while he was arguing with another student in class about playing basketball, he said, “I would whoop you in basketball just like how I whooped you in the 1800’s.” Although the board found that the comment did not meet the definition of HIB because the conduct did not substantially disrupt or interfere with the school operations or rights of other students, the administration imposed a three-day out-of-school suspension for violating the Code of Conduct (Code). Petitioner sought the expungement of the suspension.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision, concluding that the board did not act arbitrarily, without rational basis, or induced by improper motives.
The COE adopted the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision, and dismissed the petition of appeal. In dismissing the matter, the COE agreed that the board’s discipline was consistent with the Code; a hearing was not necessary because L.S. admitted to making the comment; and petitioner failed to demonstrate that the board was selectively enforcing the Code or otherwise acted in bad faith.
School Ethics Commission
Decisions Adopted On July 28, 2026
Docket Nos. C76-20, C77-20, C79-20, and C75-20 (Consolidated). The named complainants alleged that respondent violated multiple provisions of the Act, but the factual basis for the asserted violations was not provided.
Following transmittal to the OAL, the parties executed a settlement agreement which stated, in relevant part: respondent’s conduct violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (e), (f), (g), and (h); respondent voluntarily agreed that he will not serve and/or fill a seat on the board for two years from the date of the entry of the COE’s final agency decision in this case; respondent may continue to volunteer for the school district in any other capacity; respondent will submit a personal letter of apology directly to certain named complainants; and respondent should be reprimanded for his violations of the Act.
The SEC adopted the initial decision as its final decision, but did not take a position on the enforceability of the parties’ settlement agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement, the SEC recommended a penalty of reprimand.
Docket No. C86-23. The complaint alleges that respondent violated multiple provisions of the Act because she “illegally and improperly accepted an election endorsement” from the union “in exchange for negotiating with that union, which resulted in the most generous contract in … history.”
The SEC adopted the ALJ’s factual findings, the legal conclusions that respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), (c), and (e), and/or N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (f), and the dismissal of the matter. In adopting the initial decision, the SEC noted that, historically, if “more than a year has lapsed between the campaign/endorsement and the start of contract negotiations, sufficient time has passed such that the board member should be able to separate themselves from the association.” However, if, despite this lapse of time, a board member continues to have a relationship/involvement with the union, then a violation could be found. In this case, more than a year had passed since respondent was endorsed by the union and contract negotiations with the union were initiated. Moreover, complainant failed to demonstrate that respondent continued to have any kind of relationship with the union sufficient to create a conflict of interest.
The SEC, like the ALJ, also found that complainant failed to produce sufficient factual evidence to support a violation ofthe Act.
Docket No. C61-24. In the remaining counts of the complaint, complainant advised that the agenda for a public board meeting included a motion to accept the superintendent’s recommendation to non-renew and eliminate staff positions. Individuals who wished to speak were required to write their name and address on a sign-in sheet, which respondent did prior to the start of the board meeting. When her name was called, respondent left the dais and went to the microphone designated for public comment. Respondent made clear that she was speaking as a taxpayer, citizen, and community liaison. During her comments, respondent criticized the superintendent for ridiculing a Muslim man and for not supporting Muslims during Ramadan, and insinuated that the superintendent “stole staff ideas and usurped the planned Juneteenth holiday celebration” (Count 3).
After she returned to her seat on the dais, respondent made additional comments about the non-renewal process, and used the word “trickery” and stated that “skin-color” was a common component among the eliminated staff; stated that she received complaints and saw pictures of food contaminated with mold being served to the students; and stated that she heard from staff members that they were told – ostensibly by the superintendent – not to speak to board members about complaints or there would be consequences (e.g., the non-renewal of their employment contracts) (Count 5).
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), (e), and (j) in Count 3; violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) and (j) in Count 5; and did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) in Count 5. Of note, and essential to the ALJ’s legal conclusions in Count 3 was that (1) respondent admitted she did not have firsthand knowledge of the basis for her public comments and (2) the “source” of her public comments and criticisms was a district administrator.
In terms of a penalty, because respondent made “serious and inflammatory accusations” against the superintendent, and repeated false accusations against the superintendent, the ALJ recommended a penalty of censure.
The SEC concurred with the legal conclusion that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) (Count 3) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(j) (Counts 3 and 5); concurred with the legal conclusion that respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 5); and modified the legal conclusion to find that respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) (Count 3) or N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) (Count 5).
As to respondent’s argument that she relied on the advice of counsel, the SEC determined that it found violations of the Act for conduct for which she did not seek the advice of counsel; therefore, the advice of counsel defense was of no import. Finally, because respondent’s actions occurred in public, the SEC agreed with the ALJ that she should receive a public sanction (a censure).
Docket No. C136-25. The named complainant contended that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-25 because (1) she did not include her employment with the Township (as a confidential employee of the mayor) or as a realtor on her 2025 Financial Disclosure Statement (FDS), and (2) also failed to disclose her spouse’s employment with the Municipal Utilities Authority (MUA). Respondent countered that the complaint should be dismissed for untimeliness.
With regard to respondent’s failure to report her own sources of income, the SEC found that the allegation was untimely as the complaint was not filed until 244 days after complainant learned of the basis for the violation. However, the claim concerning the failure to report her spouse’s source of income was timely filed. Nonetheless, the SEC found that it was not supported by probable cause because N.J.S.A. 18A:12-26(a)(1) only requires the reporting of income from the “preceding calendar year,” and respondent’s spouse did not begin working with the MUA until March 3, 2025; therefore, his employment did not have to be disclosed on respondent’s 2025 FDS.
Docket No. C10-26. According to the complainant, the named respondent “‘was involved in a physical altercation at a local establishment’ in town that was witnessed by members of the public, including the local union president.” Although the union president tried to de-escalate the situation, respondent “refused and the situation worsened,” leading to law enforcement being called to the scene. By engaging in this conduct, complainant argued that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (e), and (i).
The SEC declined to find probable cause because complainant failed to produce sufficient factual evidence to support a violation(s) of the Act. With regard to the claimed violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), the SEC noted that, the “mere fact that respondent is a board member and was involved in an ‘incident’ in his personal capacity does not mean that his actions have compromised the [b]oard.”
Docket Nos. C43-26 and C52-26 (Consolidated). The named complainants are parents of a district student, and share “50/50 custody” of their child. Although one of the parents is “permanently disabled” and cannot safely transport their child to/from school, complainants claim that respondent (the chief school administrator) has repeatedly denied their requests for a reasonable accommodation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504). Rather than provide a reasonable accommodation, complainants additionally claim that respondent has attempted to modify the terms of the parties’ court-ordered transportation agreement, and to otherwise encourage them to waive legal rights to which they (complainants) are entitled. Because of these actions, complainants assert that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c), (e), (f), and (g).
The SEC administratively dismissed the complaint because it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims set forth in the complaint. Although dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the SEC did not find the complaint to be frivolous.
*For further information about these matters, please contact the NJSBA Legal Department at (609) 278-5279, or your board attorney for formal legal advice.
