Commissioner of Education
Noteworthy October Decisions
Docket No. 397-26 (October 5, 2026). Prior to the 2026-2027 school year, the board voluntarily provided courtesy busing to non-remote students “under the hazardous-route designation.” In April 2026, the board adopted a budget that eliminated all courtesy busing for the 2026-2027 school year, but did offer to provide busing for a fee. Thereafter, petitioner filed a request for emergent relief, and appealed the board’s decision arguing that the board was obligated to continue providing courtesy busing.
After issuing a June 25, 2026, decision concurring that petitioner was not entitled to emergent relief, the Commissioner of Education (COE) subsequently concurred with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the granting of summary decision in favor of the board was appropriate, and that the board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably when it eliminated courtesy busing for the 2026-2027 school year for all non-remote students due to budgetary constraints. In concurring, the COE reiterated that boards of education do not have a legal obligation to provide courtesy busing to non-remote students.
Docket No. 398-26 (October 5, 2026). On December 12, 2024, K.G. was involved in an incident in the school gym, during which a group of five girls approached her. Following a mutual exchange of words and gestures by all parties, two other girls subsequently – and separately – pushed K.G. to the floor. Several of the students were disciplined according to the district’s code of conduct policy, with consequences varying based on levels of culpability. The anti-bullying coordinator (ABC) conducted an investigation, and found that the group of girls who approached and eventually pushed K.G. appeared to be exchanging words and gestures that appeared aggressive in nature, indicating conflict rather than harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB). After the board affirmed the ABC’s determination that the conduct did not satisfy the definition of HIB, petitioner appealed.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board’s HIB determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In concurring with the ALJ, the COE noted that even though petitioner’s daughter faced a group of seven students, and there may have been a power imbalance, “a power imbalance alone – without another distinguishing characteristic – is not sufficient” to satisfy the definition of HIB. In addition, neither the ABC nor the petitioner identified any distinguishing characteristic of K.G. that met the criteria for satisfying the definition of HIB. In the absence of any distinguishing characteristic, the board’s decision that K.G. was not the victim of HIB was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Docket No. 399-26 (October 5, 2026). Petitioner alleged that the board (and its superintendent) violated N.J.S.A. 18A:35-5 et seq. because it “improperly” utilizes a course called “Morning Meetings” to satisfy the 150-minute weekly health and physical education requirements required by law (NJSLS-Comprehensive Health and Physical Education (CHPE)), and provides instruction for this course with teachers who do not possess a health and physical education endorsement.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board’s use of elementary school teachers and “Morning Meetings” to provide a portion of the instruction required under N.J.S.A. 18A:35-5 et seq. and the NJSLS-CHPE was an appropriate use of its discretion over curriculum choices, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Docket No. 408-26E (October 13, 2026). Petitioner sought emergent relief requiring the board to perform and provide a “due diligence evaluation” of whether the Divine Kidz Academy was eligible to provide preschool services to the district.
The ALJ found that petitioner did not demonstrate irreparable harm, one of the four factors required in order to succeed on an emergent relief application, because petitioner “could enroll her child free of charge in any of the respondent’s thirty approved preschool sites that are already under contract with” the board.
The ALJ also concluded that petitioner did not establish that the legal right underlying her claim was settled or that she had a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of her claim because petitioner solely relied upon the NJDOE’s guidance on the New Jersey Universal Preschool and Kindergarten Act, which directed districts to “demonstrate [] due diligence efforts to establish partnerships with all eligible private [preschool] providers,” but does not require districts to contract with said providers. Based on the above, the ALJ denied petitioner’s request for emergent relief and the COE concurred that petitioner did not demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief.
Docket No. 409-26SEC (October 13, 2026). The COE concurred with the School Ethics Commission (SEC) that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) when he endorsed three candidates for board election through a flyer and a letter, which he signed using his title as a board member and did not include a disclaimer. The COE also agreed with the SEC’s recommended penalty of reprimand; respondent neither filed exceptions to the recommended penalty, nor instituted an appeal of the SEC’s underlying finding of a violation.
Docket No. 415-26 (October 15, 2026). The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board’s decision to withhold petitioners’ increments during the 2021-2022 school year, without providing written notice, was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:29-14 requires the board to provide written notice, “together with the reasons therefor,” to the affected teaching staff member within 10 days of the board’s vote to withhold the increment. Because the board failed to do so, the COE also agreed with the ALJ that the board must pay the increments to petitioners pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:29-14.
Docket No. 416-26 (October 15, 2026). G.S. applied to the district through the Interdistrict School Choice Act (Act), but the board did not accept him because his IEP could not be implemented in the district and/or his enrollment would require the district to fundamentally alter the nature of its educational program. Petitioners appealed and argued that the board never provided “a detailed statement [with] a legitimate basis for rejected [G.S.’s] application.”
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision and concluded that the district complied with the notice requirement of N.J.S.A. 18A:36B-20(d) because neither the Act, nor its implementing regulations, “require a choice district to provide a detailed substantive analysis of every component of a student’s IEP or to engage in an extended justification process upon request of a parent.” The COE concurred that the board satisfied the notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:36B-20(d) and that summary decision in favor of the board was appropriate.
Docket No. 417-26 (October 15, 2026). Petitioner lives in the Union School District (Union), but also owns a home in the Elizabeth School District (Elizabeth) and used that address to enroll her son, D.O.C., in Elizabeth for the 2025-2026 school year. Although petitioner claimed that the family lives at the Elizabeth home three nights per week, the district’s investigation revealed that the family resided at the house in Union on school days and D.O.C.’s school computer never pinged from the Elizabeth address. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that petitioner and her child were not domiciled in Elizabeth and directed petitioner to reimburse Elizabeth for D.O.C.’s ineligible attendance in the amount of $10,443.90. The COE concurred with the ALJ’s legal conclusion and tuition assessment.
Docket No. 418-26R (October 15, 2026). Petitioner began her employment with the board as a secretary and acquired tenure in this position pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. At some point thereafter, she began working as a School Monitor. In 2026, the board eliminated the School Monitor position due to a reduction in force and terminated petitioner’s employment. Petitioner appealed and argued that the board violated her tenure and seniority rights because it continues to employ non-tenured, less senior secretaries.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that petitioner relinquished her secretarial tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 when she accepted the position of School Monitor. However, the COE remanded the matter and directed the ALJ to make factual findings regarding the nature of the School Monitor position and the duties performed in that position. The COE explained that, if the ALJ finds that the School Monitor position is neither a secretarial nor clerical position (as alleged by the board), then petitioner has relinquished her secretarial rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2.
Docket No. 427-26 (October 22, 2026). On September 10, 2025, petitioners’ child, O.G.F., was suspended from middle school, and the building principal notified N.F. that O.G.F. needed to be picked up. Upon arriving at the school, petitioners were asked to stay outside, but entered the school building anyway. N.F. proceeded to walk through the hallways, and the school issued a shelter-in-place announcement. Petitioners exited the building approximately four minutes after entering. The confrontation escalated outside the building, with N.F. yelling at and following the building principal. Petitioners left the school, but N.F. returned later that afternoon and remained outside the building, necessitating a second shelter-in-place announcement. Later that evening, the superintendent sent an email to N.F. prohibiting him and A.G.-F. from entering the middle school. The next day (September 11, 2025), A.G.-F. appeared at the school and was asked to leave. A.G.-F. stayed for several minutes outside the building, argued with staff, but eventually left. The next day, the superintendent sent an email to N.F., prohibiting both he and A.G.-F. from all district schools and campuses based on A.G.-F.’s defiance of the restrictions imposed the day before. Petitioners appealed.
The ALJ found that the board’s decision to prohibit A.G.-F. and N.F. from entering the middle school was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. However, the ALJ found that the board’s decision to ban A.G.-F. from all district property was arbitrary and capricious because A.G.-F. never received the email prohibiting her from entering the middle school (only N.F. received it), and A.G.-F. did not attempt to enter the building on September 11, 2025.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board’s decision prohibiting A.G.-F. and N.F. from accessing the middle school, and prohibiting N.F. from accessing all district property, was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. According to the COE, the record demonstrated that both A.G.-F. and N.F. entered the middle school despite being asked not to, and caused a disturbance, and that N.F. engaged in further disruptive behavior by returning to the middle school later that same day.
The COE also concurred with the ALJ “that a decision that was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable at the time it was made could become so through the passage of time without any review.” As such, the COE directed the board to “review the bans imposed on petitioners no later than its December 2026 regularly scheduled meeting.” If the decision is made to continue the bans, the board was directed to “review them again prior to the start of the 2027-2028 school year, and each school year subsequent, unless and until the bans are lifted.”
Docket No. 428-26 (October 22, 2026). Respondent suspended petitioner’s “S” endorsement to operate a school bus for six months after a child, who had fallen asleep, remained on petitioner’s school bus at the end of his transportation route. Although he acknowledged that the sleeping child remained on the bus after he departed from the middle school, petitioner challenged the suspension of his “S” endorsement primarily because he looked in his rearview mirror to visually inspect the bus (but did not notice the sleeping child) before departing from the middle school.
The COE adopted the ALJ’s initial decision dismissing the petition of appeal. The COE noted that the bus driver’s use of his mirror to visually inspect the school bus was ineffective and inconsistent with the clear purpose of the visual inspection as expressed in the statute’s plain language, i.e., “to determine that no pupil has been left on the bus” in the interest of student safety. Per the COE, “[u]se of the mirror alone does not allow for a thorough visual inspection of the school bus as contemplated by the statute because the entire school bus cannot be viewed from the mirror.” The COE also agreed with the ALJ that N.J.S.A. 18A:39-29 does not permit consideration of mitigating circumstances, nor does it permit consideration of the fact that the child was unharmed and never left unattended. Because petitioner admits a sleeping child remained on the bus at the end of his transportation route, a six-month suspension of his “S” endorsement was mandatory.
Docket No. 429-26 (October 22, 2026). Petitioner filed an appeal and motion for emergent relief challenging the board’s decision to retain M.R. in the seventh grade (for 2026-2027) due to chronic absenteeism. Petitioner conceded that, during the 2025-2026 school year, M.R. accumulated 47 unexcused absences and failed seventh grade mathematics. The board contended that M.R.’s attendance fell substantially below the district’s 85% attendance requirement for promotion to the next grade despite home instruction, a gradual re-entry plan, counseling, a Section 504 accommodation plan, and other supports offered throughout the school year.
Upon review of the record, the ALJ determined that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. Specifically, the ALJ determined that because petitioner had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim, emergent relief was not warranted. As a result, the ALJ issued an initial decision denying petitioner’s motion for emergent relief. Because, as conceded by the parties, there were no other issues to be decided, the ALJ also dismissed the petition of appeal.
Notwithstanding the filing of exceptions by petitioner, the COE concurred that petitioner could not demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim, i.e., that the board’s decision to retain M.R. in the seventh grade was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The COE also found the other arguments proffered by petitioner in her exceptions were unavailing and did not support the granting of emergent relief. As a result, the COE adopted the initial decision as the final decision, denied petitioner’s motion for emergent relief, and dismissed the petition of appeal.
Docket No. 430-26E (October 22, 2026). D.D. disputed the requirement that her middle school general education child, L.D., must adhere to the board’s Student Use of Internet-Enabled Devices Policy (5516), in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:36-40B. Citing parental rights regarding private property and data-privacy guidelines, D.D. withheld her consent “for the installation or utilization of any third-party tracking software,” including the “Doorman program” or the “Fort Focus Mode application.” D.D. also argued that the board failed to properly respond to her exemption request from the policy, and to issue a timely decision.
Following petitioner’s appeal and request for emergent relief, the ALJ concluded that because this case involves a dispute over the application of the district’s policy regarding the use of personal internet-enabled devices, and L.D. is not a student receiving special education services and has not qualified for or been recommended to be evaluated to determine eligibility for special education or related services, “emergent relief does not apply.” Even if emergent relief did apply, D.D. failed to satisfy the four prongs necessary to establish entitlement to emergent relief.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Docket No. 438-26 (October 29, 2026). The student/victim told his stepfather that L.C. comments on his inability to read and tells him that he needs special education services, which the stepfather reported in an HIB complaint. L.C. apologized and explained that he was frustrated that the student/victim does not participate in group work. During the investigation, the student/victim circled the “sad” emoji on his statement, said that the comments are “annoying,” but noted that they “don’t affect him too much,” and that he has “learned how to deal with them.” The district’s ABS found that the conduct met the definition of HIB, and, following a hearing, the board agreed. The parent of L.C. appealed.
In consideration of the testimony and documents presented at a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the petition of appeal and concluded that the board’s decision that L.C. committed an act of HIB was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The ALJ focused on the “substantial disruption” element of the HIB definition and found the board’s determination to be justified because, although the student/victim stated that he ignored the comments, he eventually expressed concerns to his stepfather and also circled the “sad” emoji on his statement.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in determining that L.C. committed an act of HIB.
Docket No. 439-26 (October 29, 2026). Petitioner appealed the board’s determination that his employment as a principal was not renewed. The board maintained that, for provisional employees (which included petitioner), it has “the absolute right under the law to not renew.” Moreover, the board claimed that because petitioner filed his petition of appeal ninety-three (93) days after he received notice of non-renewal, the petition must be dismissed as untimely.
The ALJ concluded that petitioner failed to file his appeal within the mandatory ninety-day period, and found no evidence to consider the “extraordinary circumstances” standard that can sometimes broaden the timeframe. Therefore, the ALJ granted the board’s motion to dismiss on procedural grounds.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the petition of appeal was untimely pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) and that, therefore, the matter must be dismissed.
Docket No. 440-26 (October 29, 2026). Petitioner filed four petitions alleging that: 1) the Saddle Brook Board of Education (“Saddle Brook”) improperly disclosed a settlement agreement related to her daughter to the Pascack Valley Regional High School Board of Education (“Pascack Valley”); 2) Pascack Valley’s residency determination (that she was not domiciled in the district) was unlawful because it relied upon information in the settlement agreement disclosed by Saddle Brook; 3) Saddle Brook failed to comply with procedures regarding residency; and 4) an Executive County Superintendent improperly disclosed information about her daughter. The ALJ dismissed all four matters as time-barred pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3.
In her exceptions, petitioner argued that the 90-day filing deadline should be relaxed because of the “burden she endured as a self-represented litigant handling four interrelated legal matters.” The COE concurred with the ALJ that the petitions must be dismissed as untimely.
Docket No. 441-26 (October 29, 2026). Petitioner challenged the board’s decision to suspend J.M. for three days after he recorded a fight in the school hallway on his cell phone. Specifically, petitioner argued that the board’s treatment of the misconduct as a “Severe Violation of Technology Acceptable Use Agreement” was excessive, and that the board should have issued a “Violation of Technology Acceptable Use Agreement.”
The ALJ concluded that the board’s discipline was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable because the discipline was appropriate and consistent with past practice, and such misconduct is a “severe” violation, regardless of whether the video is shared with others (J.M. deleted the video and had not shared it).
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board’s disciplinary determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, but slightly modified the initial decision to remove consideration of the board’s Policy 2363, “Student Use of Privately-Owned Technology,” as this policy was not a part of the evidence in the record.
Docket No. 442-26 (October 29, 2026). In their petition filed on June 15, 2026, petitioners alleged that the board engaged in the “discriminatory and improper denial of [their] daughter’s school lunch benefits for the 2023-2024 school year” and violated student privacy and equal treatment obligations applicable to all New Jersey public schools under N.J.S.A. 18A:1-1 et seq. and the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Petitioners also claimed that the superintendent and board members separately discriminated and retaliated against them and their daughter. The complaint alleged that respondents’ collective violations of the law occurred on September 11, 2023.
Although petitioners invoked the “discovery rule” as a defense, and claimed they were unaware of respondents’ violations of the law until “September-October 2025,” the ALJ concluded that respondents’ allegations were “plainly barred” by the statute of limitations because they waited until June 2026 to file their complaint. The ALJ also found that K.P. lacked standing to file a cause of action on behalf of I.M. because she is “now of age and may bring a cause of action” on her own behalf. Finally, the ALJ found that the COE did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate petitioners’ claim that respondents violated the LAD and/or FERPA.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the petition of appeal was untimely pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) and that, therefore, the matter must be dismissed.
Docket No. 443-26 (October 29, 2026). The charter school issued an Order to Show Cause (OTSC) requiring respondent to show cause why an order should not be entered suspending her teaching certificates pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:26-10 and N.J.S.A. 18A:28-8 for resigning from her position without giving the 60 days’ notice required by law. Following receipt of the OTSC, respondent advised that the information in the pleadings was “accurate,” and that she accepted the suspension.
Deeming the allegations to be admitted, and because respondent sent correspondence to the charter school indicating that she was resigning from employment effective immediately and, therefore, did not provide 60-days notice, the COE found the facts sufficient to justify suspension of respondent’s teaching certificates for one year, and granted summary decision in favor of the board.
School Ethics Commission
Decisions Adopted On October 27, 2026
Docket No. C37-26. Complainant alleged that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and (c), along with N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), (d), (e), and (f) when she directed board counsel to send a “cease and desist” letter to the “[] Citizens for Responsible Government” (CRG) (of which complainant is the chair) over their display of the district’s logo on the group’s Facebook page. Complainant also argued that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and (c), along with N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), (g), and (j) when she contacted the police regarding posts on CRG’s Facebook page that she found threatening.
In relation to the cease-and-desist letter, the SEC generally found that there were insufficient facts and circumstances presented in the complaint to sustain the stated violations of the Act, but noted that “enforcing [b]oard policies would not constitute day-to-day administration of the schools” (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d)). In dismissing the allegations related to the police report, the SEC emphasized that “[r]espondent filed the complaints with the police as a private citizen, not in her capacity as a [b]oard member…[and] is free to contact the police if she believes she is experiencing harassment.”
Finally, the SEC declined to find the complaint frivolous.
Docket No. C38-26. Complainant alleged that respondent violated the Act by sending the following emails to a community member: an email referring to a former board member’s resignation email (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (g)); and an email confirming that the superintendent had already answered the board member’s question (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (i)).
The SEC generally concluded that complainant failed to present sufficient facts and circumstances to sustain the stated violations of the Act, but made specific findings regarding the following: complainant did not show how respondent disclosed confidential information because the former board member’s resignation email was available through OPRA (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g)); and, with respect to the second email, the complaint had already been resolved by the superintendent and, therefore, respondent did not act on or attempt to resolve a complaint/inquiry prior to a referral to the superintendent (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i)).
Docket No. C39-26. Complainant, the business administrator, alleged that respondent, the superintendent, violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(e) because he used the board’s Amazon account for personal purchases, and his “403(b) employer match was overpaid” in 2020, 2021, and 2022. According to complainant, respondent also violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) and N.J.S.A. 18A:24(d) because he supervised his spouse, the principal, and his child was hired without approval from the Executive County Superintendent. Complainant acknowledged that some of her allegations “fall outside the 180-day requirement,” but argued that they are part of a “longstanding and ongoing pattern of behavior within the school,” and also cited her fear of retaliation as a reason for the delay.
Because the alleged conduct occurred from 2008 through July 2025 and complainant “was aware of the events that formed the basis of the present [c]omplaint when they were happening,” the SEC dismissed the complaint for lack of timeliness pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.5. The SEC also concluded that there were no extraordinary circumstances to compel relaxation. Finally, although the complaint was untimely, the SEC did not find it to be frivolous and denied the request for sanctions.
Docket No. C40-26. Complainant alleged that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) when, at a board meeting, respondent took the following “private” actions while complainant was speaking during public comment: interrupted complainant five times; told her to “get to the point,” shut off her microphone with time remaining, and called the police. Complainant also alleged that respondent’s conduct violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) because she “used a school board meeting [as] a public forum for personal gain, specifically the gain of suppressing information and protecting their own public image.”
The SEC dismissed the complaint in its entirety and explained that, because respondent was acting in her capacity as Board President at the meeting, a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) could not be sustained. As for the asserted violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), the SEC found that there was no evidence that respondent used the schools to acquire a benefit for herself, an immediate family member, or a friend when she cut off complainant’s comments and had her removed during a meeting.
Despite the dismissal of the complaint, the SEC did not find it to be frivolous.
Docket No. C46-26. According to complainants, during and following a board meeting, respondent engaged in “disorderly” and “unprofessional” conduct toward the board president, board attorney, and a parent, which violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) (Count 1). Complainants also argued that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (e), (f), and (g) when he “disseminated a letter” that was the subject of an executive session discussion and addressed concerns that complainants violated OPMA (Count 2). This letter “was subsequently published on social media by ‘CITIZENS AGAINST CORRUPTION’ an organization with which [respondent] is reportedly affiliated as a founder.”
With respect to Count 1, the SEC determined that the allegations were not sufficient for a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) because board members, the board attorney, and parents are not school personnel. The SEC also dismissed the allegations in Count 2 for lack of probable cause, specifically finding that: “[t]he fact that the letter was posted in the CITIZENS AGAINST CORRUPTION Facebook group does not mean that [r]espondent took action on behalf of, or at their request” (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f)); and complainants did not demonstrate the letter was required to be kept confidential by respondent or that it was inaccurate (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g)).
Although the SEC dismissed the complaint in its entirety, it concluded that it was not frivolous.
Docket No. C48-26, C49-26, C50-26, and C61-26. Complainant, a former employee in the district, filed four (4) ethics complaints, each against a separate administrator, but based upon substantially the same facts, and all stemming from the allegation that “the district conducted only a minimal and incomplete investigation” of complainant’s report that one of the district’s security guards made a false complaint about him on September 16, 2024.
In their written statements, all respondents sought the dismissal of the complaints because complainant filed the complaints beyond the 180-day limitation period. According to complainant, he did not file his complaints until 2026 because he “did not know, and could not have reasonably known, that the [SEC] had jurisdiction until late 2025.” He further explained that, it was not until he discussed the situation with a “friend” that he was “informed” that he was able to pursue his claims through the SEC.
The SEC dismissed all four complaints as untimely pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.5. The SEC concluded that “[c]omplainant was aware of the events that formed the within [c]omplaint[s] when they were happening” and noted that complainant “could have researched potential filing procedures…including whether filing an ethics complaint was an option.” The SEC emphasized that complainant’s “ignorance of the administrative process does not allow him to file a complaint two years later” and further determined that there were no extraordinary circumstances present to warrant relaxation of the 180-day limitation period.
In addition to the complaints being untimely, the SEC also noted that it does not have jurisdiction over matters regarding potential violations of board policies and/or human resources policies, including whether the district conducted a proper investigation.
*For further information about these matters, please contact the NJSBA Legal Department at (609) 278-5279, or your board attorney for formal legal advice.
