Commissioner of Education
Noteworthy September Decisions
Docket No. 345-26E (September 2, 2026). In December 2025, A.F., X.X.’s mother, kicked X.X. out of their home in the Clementon Township School District (Clementon). From that time, through the date of the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision in this matter, X.X. lived with her paternal grandparents, M.C. and G.C. (petitioners) in the Sterling Township School District (Sterling), with the exception of one week in March 2026. During that week, X.X. was returned to A.F.’s home in Clementon while the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) was involved, but DCPP ultimately placed X.X. in petitioners’ home, where she has remained since. When petitioners tried to enroll X.X. in Sterling at the conclusion of the 2025-2026 school year, Sterling denied admission. Thereafter, petitioners filed an emergent application to challenge Sterling’s decision.
In “considering the weight attributed to [DCPP] placing X.X. in petitioners’ … home,” the ALJ concluded that petitioners satisfied the four prongs required for an emergent relief application, and directed X.X.’s enrollment in Sterling.
Upon review, the Commissioner of Education (COE) concurred with the ALJ that petitioner demonstrated entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Docket No. 347-26 (September 3, 2026). During recess, A.H., a fourth-grade student, was “physically restrained and held down against her will by two other [d]istrict students for about fifty-seven seconds,” while they asked A.H., “Why do you wear makeup?” and “Why are you sassy?” Following a hearing, the board determined that the incident did not meet the definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB) because the conflict was not motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic. The parents appealed.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision and dismissed the petition of appeal, finding that there was sufficient, credible evidence supporting the board’s decision and agreeing that the alleged comments to A.H. did “not touch upon or refer to any such actual or perceived characteristic.”
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in determining that petitioners’ child was not the victim of HIB.
Docket No. 349-26 (September 3, 2026). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, the New Jersey Department of Education’s (NJDOE) Office of Student Protection permanently disqualified petitioner from employment in public schools in New Jersey because his criminal history record revealed several convictions for disqualifying offenses. In his appeal, petitioner argued that his criminal convictions were nearly two decades old and do not reflect his current character or qualifications.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner is permanently disqualified from employment as a school bus driver pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1 and adopted the ALJ’s initial decision dismissing the petition of appeal.
Docket No. 360-26R (September 10, 2026). As part of a residency investigation, the district determined that the property owned by respondent in the district was “uninhabitable and undergoing renovation.” Despite using this address to register his children in the district, and because of the condition of the house, petitioner and his children resided in Philadelphia. In his response to the district’s notice of ineligibility, petitioner conceded that while his children attended school in the district from September through December 2025, they actually resided in Philadelphia.
Following an appeal of the board’s decision that E.A. and D.A. were not domiciled in the district, the COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner and his minor children were not domiciled in the district from September 2, 2025, through December 23, 2025; therefore, they were not entitled to a free public education in the district and petitioner must reimburse the district for the period of their ineligible attendance. However, the COE was constrained to remand the matter because the ALJ did not make any factual findings regarding the per diem tuition rate or the number of days of ineligible attendance during the relevant time period.
Docket No. 365-26 (September 15, 2026). On September 1, 2024, petitioner began employment in the district as a teacher. On April 11, 2025, the board applied to the NJDOE, on petitioner’s behalf, for two provisional certificates, each with an effective date of September 1, 2024. On April 14, 2025, the NJDOE denied the application because the board did not register petitioner’s employment within 60 days of her start date. On April 30, 2025, the board reapplied for the provisional certificates, but listed petitioner’s start date as March 1, 2025, a fictitious date, to align with the 60-day timeframe. The NJDOE approved and issued petitioner the two provisional certificates, each with a start date of March 1, 2025. On June 5, 2025, petitioner appealed the NJDOE’s denial of the first application for her provisional certificates (to reflect a start date of September 1, 2024), and named the NJDOE and the board as respondents.
Following the filing of a motion for summary decision, the ALJ found that, notwithstanding the 60-day deadline within which districts are supposed to “register” teachers (N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-8.4(b)), the effective date for petitioner’s provisional certificates must be the date on which the certificate holder began employment with the district in a certified position, or September 1, 2024.
After the initial decision was issued, the COE received a stipulation of dismissal indicating that petitioner’s claims were moot, and that the matter was resolved. Therefore, the COE rejected the initial decision “based on the change in circumstances,” and dismissed the matter with prejudice.
Docket No. 366-26 (September 15, 2026). Petitioner, the district superintendent, was placed on administrative leave at a board meeting. Petitioner challenged the board’s action at the meeting on October 13, 2025, claiming that the board failed to post the minutes on BoardDocs. As part of his appeal, petitioner asked for the board to be directed to “restore the October 13, 2025, meeting minutes regarding the resolution placing him on administrative leave, which he claims were removed from the [b]oard’s BoardDocs website.”
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision, and concluded that petitioner had standing to file the appeal; the board did not violate the OPMA because the record shows that just “days after the meeting in question,” the minutes of the meeting were posted and are still available; and the matter is moot.
The COE accepted the ALJ’s finding that the board’s October 13, 2025, minutes are currently available on its website, and the corresponding conclusion that the board did not violate the OPMA with regard to the posting of those minutes. The COE also concurred that the matter is moot.
Docket No. 369-26R (September 16, 2026). Following remand, the board provided additional discovery to petitioner, including certifications from board members expressing numerous reasons why they did not vote in favor of her appointment (e.g., negative public opinion, emails written by petitioner, and personal interactions with petitioner). The board again moved for summary decision. The ALJ made findings of fact based upon the expanded record, and granted the board’s motion for summary decision.
The COE rejected the ALJ’s initial decision and explained that summary decision was inappropriate “because the additional discovery and certifications…demonstrate that the reasons for petitioner’s non-appointment are contested.” The COE concluded that the ALJ was unable to determine whether the board exceeded its power to withhold approval of petitioner’s appointment because the material facts are contested. Therefore, the COE again remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a contested hearing.
Docket No. 392-26 (September 30, 2026). The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably when it denied petitioner’s daughter entry into the School Choice Program Lottery because it is undisputed that she did not meet the academic requirements. Therefore, the COE adopted the ALJ’s initial decision granting the board’s motion for summary decision and dismissing the appeal.
Docket No. 393-26 (September 30, 2026). The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner’s children are not legally entitled to courtesy busing from their childcare provider’s home to their school for the 2025-2026 school year even though the board provided this transportation for them during the prior two school years. The COE explained that the board’s decision to deny petitioner’s special transportation request for the 2025-2026 school year was consistent with state law and board policy and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, the COE adopted the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision and dismissed the appeal.
Docket No. 394-26 (September 30, 2026). The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner filed her appeal regarding two HIB investigations before the board rendered its final decisions, and, therefore, the appeal was premature under N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(e), which provides that only a final decision of a board may be appealed to the COE. Accordingly, the COE adopted the ALJ’s initial decision that granted the board’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal.
Docket No. 395-26SEC (September 30, 2026). The COE reviewed the School Ethics Commission’s (SEC) recommendation, following the execution of a settlement agreement between the parties, that respondent be reprimanded. The COE concurred with the penalty recommended by the SEC.
Docket No. 396-26SEC (September 30, 2026). Respondent neither filed exceptions to the SEC’s recommended penalty of censure, nor instituted an appeal of the SEC’s finding that she violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (j) when, at a public board meeting, her comments included information that she only received by virtue of her position as a board member, and also undermined an investigation, the complaint process, and the district’s chain of command. The COE concurred with the SEC’s recommended penalty of censure.
School Ethics Commission
Decisions Adopted On September 22, 2026
Advisory Opinion, A16-26. The requestor is an administrator in a school district and, in this role, manages the district’s childcare center. The district receives Preschool Education Aid (PEA) funding, but another person manages all aspects of PEA funding and partnerships for the district. The administrator is “evaluating the acquisition and ownership of an independent private daycare/childcare center” located in a different county. The administrator inquired whether ownership of an independent/private daycare center in a county outside of their employing school district was a conflict of interest, and whether a conflict would arise if the independent/private daycare partners with other public school districts through PEA funding.
The SEC advised that because the independent/private daycare center potentially being acquired “does not appear to be a daycare center under the control of, overseen by, or otherwise managed by the [b]oard and/or the [d]istrict where” the administrator was employed, the Act did not “per se prohibit [the administrator’s] involvement in the daycare center generally, or in an ownership role, specifically.” In addition, when interfacing with other public school districts as the owner of the independent/private daycare center, the SEC advised that the administrator must clarify they are doing so as the owner of the independent/private daycare center, and not in their capacity as an administrator in the district for which they are employed. The SEC also provided the administrator with guidelines for their district employment.
Docket No. C93-22. The parties stipulated to the following facts: respondents jointly ran for the board in 2019 under the “Better [Town] BOE” moniker; the individual who owns the property at which their campaign was registered served as the campaign’s chairperson and treasurer; the campaign received contributions of over $14,000 from other campaign committees owned by their chairperson and treasurer; respondents jointly ran for reelection in 2022, and their campaign had the same chairperson and treasurer as previously; on August 15, 2022, and September 19, 2022, respondents voted to approve lease payments for the property owned by their chairperson and treasurer; in October and November 2022, the campaign received over $17,000 (collectively) from other campaign committees owned by their chairperson and treasurer.
The ALJ found that respondents violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) on August 15, 2022, and September 19, 2022, because they voted to approve rental payments to the person who presently (and previously) served as their joint campaign’s chairperson and treasurer and who, through his own campaign committees, contributed over $14,000 to respondents’ election campaign, and over $17,000 to their reelection campaign. According to the ALJ, the relationship between respondents and this individual created an “indirect financial involvement that might reasonably be expected to impair [their] objectivity or independence of judgment,” and created “a conflict requiring [r]espondents to recuse themselves from votes involving … [him], which they failed to do in voting to approve rental payments to [him].” The ALJ recommended a penalty of censure because “the public perception of the votes herein are important” and “the votes to make rental payments to … [their joint campaign’s chairperson and treasurer] could easily be perceived by members of the public as improper and done to curry favor with … [this individual].”
The SEC adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact; the legal conclusion that respondents violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c); and the recommended penalty of censure.
Docket No. C107-22. A complaint was filed against the named respondents in which it was contended that they violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), (g), and (j). After the matter was transmitted to the OAL, the parties executed a settlement agreement which acknowledged that respondents “took individual action by forwarding information pertaining to [b]oard communications to those who may not be entitled to it in violation of the [Act],” and indicated that they would “provide a private apology to” complainant.
Upon review, the SEC did not “find a reason why it should not defer to the parties’ mutual decision to amicably resolve their dispute.” Therefore, the SEC voted to adopt the initial decision (settlement) as the final decision, but did not take a position on the enforceability of the parties’ written settlement agreement.
Docket No. C54-24. Complainant advised that at a board meeting on May 9, 2024, the superintendent provided the board with a letter from the Director of Special Services (Director) which requested a salary increase. During an Individualized Education Program meeting that respondent attended for her grandchild on May 23, 2024, and in a phone call with an unnamed “subordinate” thereafter, respondent purportedly shared confidential information from/about the Director’s letter in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g).
Following the filing of a motion for summary decision, the ALJ found that complainant “has not produced or proffered any evidence that any confidential information was disclosed …”; “there is no evidence that N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) was violated or that a hearing could demonstrate any such violation”; and complainant “does not have personal knowledge nor any witnesses or evidence to demonstrate” a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g). Therefore, the ALJ granted summary decision in favor of respondent, and dismissed the complaint.
The SEC adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact; the legal conclusion that respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g); and agreed that the matter should be dismissed.
Docket No. C36-25. Complainant contended that the named respondent “published three Facebook posts” that violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), (d), (e), and (g). In the first post (Count 1), respondent inquired, “As a resident of Alloway, I am wondering what other residents think about a 9-15% school tax increase?” This post had a disclaimer at the end stating, “The above statements are made in my capacity as a private citizen, and not in my capacity as a board member. These statements are also not representative of the [b]oard or its individual members and solely represent my own personal opinions.” In the second post (Count 2), respondent stated, “I am ASKING this FOR MYSELF NOT for the board. What if the taxes went up to 20% is that a number you will except?” (sic). In the third post (Count 3), respondent asked, “If taxes will need to be raised by 30% to keep the school open what is your opinion?”
In reviewing the respondent’s social media posts, the SEC noted that respondent used a disclaimer on two of the three posts – one indicating that she was asking for herself and not for the board (Count 2), and the second indicating that the statements were in her capacity as a private citizen, and not as a board member, and that the opinions were not representative of the board or its individual members (Count 1). Given the use of disclaimers, the SEC found that a reasonable member of the public would not perceive that she was speaking in her official capacity as a board member.
With respect to the one post without a disclaimer (Count 3), the SEC advised that the lack of a disclaimer is not dispositive. Moreover, respondent’s “general public inquiry does not appear to invoke [r]espondent’s position on the [b]oard or appear, in any way, representative of the [b]oard as a whole.” Consequently, the SEC found that “there is not a sufficient nexus between the social media post and [r]espondent’s role on the [b]oard, and a reasonable member of the public would not perceive that [r]espondent was acting in her official capacity as a [b]oard member.”
Turning to the stated violations of the Act, the SEC declined to find probable cause because complainant failed to plead sufficient factual evidence to support a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), (d), (e), and/or (g).
Docket No. C32-26. According to the complainant, an incident involving a student occurred at the middle school on September 10, 2025, and “[m]ultiple police vehicles” responded. At a board meeting a few days later, the incident was mentioned during public comment by a community member with “the meeting minutes reflect[ing] that the discussion involved concerns about incidents affecting the school community and safety issues raised by members of the public.” Complainant argued that respondents, the Board President and Vice President, violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) because they permitted “discussion during the public meeting that could reasonably lead to identification of a student involved in a disciplinary matter.”
The SEC declined to find probable cause because complainant did not articulate the nature of the confidential information that respondents allegedly disclosed.
Docket No. C34-26 and C35-26 (Consolidated). Complainants are employed by the district, and are the President and Vice President of the Parent Teacher Organization (PTO). Respondent, a board member, is also a member of the PTO. In March 2026, “a disagreement arose related to volunteer activities” within the PTO. Despite the matter being unrelated to district employment matters, respondent contacted the superintendent “regarding the situation and raised concerns” about complainants. By escalating a disagreement related to the PTO to the superintendent, and leveraging the access she has to the superintendent that “ordinary citizens” do not, complainants argue that respondent misused her official position in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) and (e). In declining to find probable cause for lack of sufficient factual evidence, the SEC emphasized that board members do not give up their rights as parents when they become board members, and can contact the superintendent in their capacities as parents.
*For further information about these matters, please contact the NJSBA Legal Department at (609) 278-5279, or your board attorney for formal legal advice.
