Commissioner of Education
Noteworthy August Decisions
Docket No. 285-26 (August 6, 2026). On May 15, 2025, the board notified petitioner that it would not rehire him as a Media Specialist for the 2025-2026 school year. Seven months later, and on December 15, 2025, petitioner appealed the board’s decision not to renew his employment.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the board’s motion for summary decision, finding that: petitioner acknowledged receipt of the board’s decision on May 15, 2025; petitioner did not assert fraud, defective notice, or misleading conduct by the board (but did claim that the board should have rehired him because it failed to properly train him); petitioner’s claims only have “personal significance” and, therefore, make relaxation of the 90-day filing rule inappropriate; there are no exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons warranting relaxation of the 90-day rule; and because petitioner’s appeal was filed well beyond 90-days, it must be dismissed.
The Commissioner of Education (COE) concurred with the ALJ that petitioner’s appeal was untimely pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i).
Docket No. 286-26 (August 6, 2026). Ethics charges were filed against Boyle after she hand-delivered a “package” of board-related documents to a district administrator (at his home) who filed a lawsuit against the board. On September 16, 2022, Boyle was advised by board counsel that the board would not reimburse her for the legal fees and costs that she would incur in defending the complaint because the conduct which formed the basis for the ethics charges was “private.” On February 11, 2026, Boyle appealed the board’s determination to deny reimbursement of her legal fees and costs to the COE.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion to dismiss, finding that: the period of limitations for filing an appeal began when board counsel advised Boyle, in a letter dated September 16, 2022, that her request for reimbursement of legal fees was denied; Boyle filed her appeal on February 11, 2026 – 1,244 days later – which was well beyond the 90-day period of limitations; there are no exceptional circumstances or other compelling reasons warranting the relaxation of the 90-day period of limitations; and that because Boyle’s conduct “did not rise out of or occur in the course of her duties as a [b]oard member,” she was “not entitled to reimbursement of counsel fees under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20.”
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner’s appeal was untimely pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i). Of note, the COE did not address the ALJ’s determination that Boyle’s conduct was not eligible for indemnification.
Docket No. 287-26 (August 6, 2026). According to board counsel, the board issued an “initial residency determination” that petitioner and her child, A.S., did not reside in the district. Petitioner filed a petition of appeal to challenge the determination and board counsel requested that the matter be held in abeyance until the board provided petitioner with the opportunity to participate in a residency hearing. The New Jersey Department of Education’s Office of Controversies and Disputes (C & D) granted this request, and directed board counsel to keep them informed of the hearing date and outcome.
When board counsel failed to provide any updates to C & D, did not respond to any of C & D’s emails, and did not file an answer to the petition, the COE decided the matter on a summary basis pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(e), and accepted as fact that petitioner resides in the district. Therefore, the COE concluded that petitioner’s child was entitled to a free public education in the district, and reversed the board’s residency determination.
Docket No. 288-26 (August 6, 2026). Appellant appealed the School Ethics Commission’s (SEC) determination that he violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) when he used his board title and position to generate clients and volunteers for his non-profit organization, Math Adventures and Word Play (MAWP).
The COE concluded that the SEC’s decision with respect to the violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) was supported by sufficient, credible evidence, and appellant did not demonstrate that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The COE noted that appellant did not contest that he: arranged and promoted MAWP to students in the district through emails sent from his board account; or that he helped promote MAWP through flyers and information posted on the district’s website.
However, the COE rejected the SEC’s conclusion that appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) because this decision was not supported by the record. The COE explained that the cases cited by the SEC regarding violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) involved board members who acted in their official capacities by voting on a matter in which they had a conflict (which was not the case here).
In affirming the SEC’s conclusion that appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a), the COE also concurred with the SEC’s recommended penalty of reprimand.
Docket No. 301-26 (August 12, 2026). While waiting for the doors to open before school, a group of three boys approached the victim, a sixth-grade student with a disability, and began playing tag with him, even though he told them to stop because it made him uncomfortable. The victim hid behind a basketball hoop to get away from the group of boys. The principal reported this event, which led to a harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB) investigation. The HIB investigation revealed that the group of boys regularly “bother” the victim in the hallway, during recess, and when transitioning to classes; Offender One was the ringleader of the group; the group repeatedly asked the victim questions that distressed him, and the victim asked them to stop (but they did not); T.B. acknowledged that Offender One teased and mocked the victim, and that he was aware that the victim got mad when people tried to play tag with him; and T.B. was observed acting “in a mocking way” toward the victim that he knew was upsetting to the victim (including “mockingly chewing a pencil”). Petitioners appealed the board’s determination that T.B. committed HIB.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision, as the board’s decision that T.B. committed HIB was appropriate, had a rational basis, and had sufficient evidentiary support. In granting the board’s motion, the ALJ noted that even though T.B. did not participate in all inappropriate conduct, and that his conduct when compared to others may not have been as significant, “a single event that meets the elements of an HIB violation remains an HIB violation.”
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in determining that T.B. committed HIB.
Docket No. 302-26 (August 12, 2026). C.J., a fourth-grade student, was suspended for one day after he was involved in a physical altercation with a special education student (with a 1:1 aide) in the cafeteria on September 30, 2025. The board then suspended C.J. for two days after he was involved in another physical altercation with a different student in the media center on October 30, 2025. The building principal believed that the out-of-school suspensions were appropriate because of her concern for student and staff safety, and because both altercations occurred in crowded areas.
Following an appeal, the ALJ found that the board’s suspensions were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or otherwise made in bad faith. In the first incident, C.J. grabbed a special education student with enough force that he almost knocked the child backwards off his seat in the cafeteria. He did not stop until an aide intervened. In the second incident, C.J. bumped and swung at another student multiple times without stopping until two teachers intervened.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that the board’s decisions to suspend C.J. pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:37-2(d) for one day after he physically assaulted a student, and then for two days after he physically assaulted another student, were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Docket No. 328-26 (August 24, 2026). When H.O., a student with a disability who has a 504 Plan, came to class without his music binder, petitioner, a middle school music and band teacher, asked him where he might have left it, and also asked if anyone else in the class had it. H.O.’s parents filed an HIB complaint based on this incident and two others involving petitioner.
In finding that the binder incident constituted HIB, the ABS focused on H.O.’s 504 Plan and the fact that petitioner did not utilize the accommodation of “non-verbal cues to help with focus and redirection” during the incident. In affirming that petitioner committed an act of HIB, the board’s decision did not distinguish between the three different incidents in the complaint. Petitioner appealed.
The ALJ concluded that the board acted in “utter disregard of the [factual] circumstances before it” and reversed the board’s HIB decision. However, the COE explained that a “meaningful review of the decision on appeal” was precluded by the board’s argument that it only found the binder incident to constitute HIB, while “[a]ny rational reading of the [b]oard’s decision must lead to the conclusion that the [b]oard found all three incidents to be HIB.” Therefore, the COE remanded the matter to the board to issue a new decision that clearly expresses its HIB determination.
Docket No. 330-26 (August 26, 2026). A.H. attended the board’s schools through eighth grade, and also participated in band during that time. After electing to enroll in an out-of-district high school, A.H. contacted the board and requested administrative permission to participate in the high school band. The board denied A.H.’s request because, among other things: the student knowingly selected a high school without a marching band program; there were other music-related extracurriculars available to the student; financial and logistical burdens for the board; and the fact that the competitive marching band season was well underway.
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision finding that a board of education cannot, under a blanket policy, exclude a particular student or group of students from participating in an extracurricular activity without a sound rational basis. However, in this case, the board has met its burden and demonstrated a rational basis for its decision-making.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to establish that the board’s denial of A.H.’s request to join the high school marching band was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Docket No. 331-26 (August 26, 2026). Petitioner previously resided at an apartment in the district and registered her children in school based on that address. However, in February 2025, after living at that address for around eight years, she left the apartment because of mold. Petitioner stated that she could not find an affordable apartment, so she and her children moved in with the aunt of her child’s father at a public housing complex in the district. Petitioner acknowledged that she never reported to the district that she was homeless, nor did she report the new address. Petitioner also works as a home health aide for a client in Linden and that is why the district’s residency investigator saw her car there.
The ALJ concluded that petitioner proved by a preponderance of evidence that her domicile is in the district. The ALJ emphasized that “[i]t is of no import that [petitioner] is not on the lease, that her aunt may not have reported the family’s presence to the public housing complex, or that this may be a temporary arrangement until [petitioner] finds an affordable apartment of her own.”
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner’s minor children were entitled to attend school in the district during the entirety of the 2025-2026 school year because the family was domiciled within the district.
School Ethics Commission
Decisions Adopted On August 25, 2026
Advisory Opinion, A15-26. The requestor indicated that the board’s Policy 1330 requires the board to evaluate the business administrator (BA); however, some board members declined to participate in the BA’s evaluation. The requestor asked whether board members A, B, and C could participate in the repeal of Policy 1330.
The SEC reminded that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1, only the superintendent has the authority to recommend all appointments, transfers, removals or renewals of board employees, including the BA, to the board. The SEC also emphasized that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(h), the role of the board member is to vote to appoint the best qualified personnel available after consideration of the recommendation of the superintendent. Therefore, the SEC confirmed that, in accordance with the above statutes, it is not the board’s responsibility to hire or evaluate any district personnel other than the superintendent.
That said, the SEC advised that the subject board members would not violate the Act if they participate in the repeal of Board Policy 1330, “regardless of whether they declined to participate in completing the evaluation required under [the policy] in the past.”
Docket No. C90-24. The SEC adopted the ALJ’s legal conclusions that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) when he endorsed three candidates for board election through a flyer and a letter that the local Republican Organization distributed. In finding violations of the Act, the SEC focused on the fact that respondent signed the letter using his title as a board member, but did not include a disclaimer that his actions were not representative of the full board. The SEC also adopted the ALJ’s recommended penalty of reprimand.
Docket No. C105-25. Respondent, the superintendent, did not disclose a business that her spouse co-owns with a principal in the district, on her 2025 Financial Disclosure Statement (FDS). Respondent admitted that her spouse and the principal formed an LLC, “but it has never made a profit” and does not generate $2,000 in income. Respondent also noted that she consulted with board counsel regarding the LLC and whether she needed to report it on her FDS, but board counsel advised that it was “unclear.”
The SEC explained that because the LLC has an asset (a rental property) and respondent’s spouse has an interest in the LLC, the LLC qualified as a “business interest” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-26(a)(4) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-23, and respondent was required to report it on her FDS. The failure to do so resulted in an inaccurate FDS, which the SEC concluded violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-25. The SEC also rejected respondent’s “advice of counsel” argument because board counsel did not advise respondent not to disclose the LLC.
Finally, the SEC recommended a penalty of censure because “[i]t was especially important for [r]espondent to disclose [the LLC] because her spouse owns it with a principal in the [d]istrict where she works, and that principal would report to [r]espondent.”
Docket No. C11-26. Complainant alleged that respondents, who are administrators in the district, violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), (c), (d), and (f) when their attorney attended a board meeting, spoke during public comment, and “relayed confidential district legal matters previously discussed in executive session and relayed lies to the public at the request of [respondents].”
The SEC generally found that complainant presented insufficient facts and circumstances to prove the stated violations of the Act, but, with respect to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), the SEC elaborated that complainant did “not articulate what confidential information [r]espondents’ attorney is alleged to have revealed or shared when he spoke in public session…[or] show[] how [r]espondents attorney’s statements during public session constituted [r]espondents using or attempting to use their official position to secure an unwarranted privilege, advantage or employment for themselves, members of their immediate family, or ‘others.’”
Docket No. C20-26. Respondent’s spouse applied for a board vacancy and, according to complainant, respondent sent a text message to non-board members, in which he named the board candidates for the vacancy and also stated that, “[T]he Super said that she never received my wife’s email (bullshit)…”
Complainant alleged that respondent’s conduct violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) because he used his board position for the gain of his spouse in her application for the vacant seat; N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) because he sent a group text to non-board members that disclosed the identity of the other applicants; and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(i) because he failed to support personnel by publicly declaring that the superintendent lied about not receiving his spouse’s application.
The SEC generally concluded that complainant did not meet the burden of proof for factually establishing violations of the Act.
Docket No. C25-26. Complainant alleged that respondent violated several sections of the Act when he: advocated for and provided information to the vendor that was not available to other bidders (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and (c)); directed a board employee to take action toward contracting with this vendor outside of the procurement process (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e)); and advocated for a vendor in which he may have a financial interest and also used his position to advance private business interests (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) and (b)).
The SEC dismissed the complaint in its entirety, finding the complaint to be devoid of any facts regarding how respondent advocated for a specific insurance vendor or how he has a conflict with the vendor; however, the SEC determined that the complaint was not frivolous.
Docket No. C30-26. Respondent, a principal, emailed complainant about his child’s HIB investigation and informed him that she did not see evidence of HIB and was going to include the child’s mother on the correspondence, so that she could share the child’s support plan with both parents. According to complainant, respondent and the child’s mother have a “personal relationship” and respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) by failing to recuse herself from matters involving his child.
In dismissing the complaint, the SEC stated that although complainant “speculated that [r]espondent and his child’s mother have a ‘relationship,’ that could be a conflict, [c]omplainant [did] not even articulate what sort of relationship or conflict this would be, let alone provide evidence of said conflict.”
Finally, the SEC also declined to find the complaint to be frivolous.
Docket No. T02-26. On July 28, 2026, the SEC adopted and mailed an Order to Show Cause (OTSC) to respondent because they failed to complete mandated training by December 31, 2025. Respondent failed to respond to the OTSC; failed to explain why they did not complete training by the statutory deadline; and never completed training. As a result, the SEC found that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-33, and recommended a penalty of removal. However, if respondent completes the training before the COE issues a final decision, the SEC recommends a 30-day suspension.
Docket No. T03-26. On July 28, 2026, the SEC adopted and mailed an OTSC to respondent because they failed to complete mandated training by December 31, 2025. After receiving the OTSC, respondent completed the training requirement by August 1, 2026, but did not respond to the OTSC as to why they did not complete the training by December 31, 2025. As a result, the SEC found that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-33, and recommended a penalty of censure.
Docket No. T04-26. On July 28, 2026, the SEC adopted and mailed an OTSC to respondent because they failed to complete mandated training by December 31, 2025. Respondent failed to respond to the OTSC; failed to explain why they did not complete training by the statutory deadline; and never completed training. As a result, the SEC found that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-33, and recommended a penalty of removal. However, if respondent completes the training before the COE issues a final decision, the SEC recommends a 30-day suspension.
Docket No. T05-26. On July 28, 2026, the SEC adopted and mailed an OTSC to respondent because they failed to complete mandated training by December 31, 2025. Respondent failed to respond to the OTSC; failed to explain why they did not complete training by the statutory deadline; and never completed training. As a result, the SEC found that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-33, and recommended a penalty of removal. However, if respondent completes the training before the COE issues a final decision, the SEC recommends a 30-day suspension.
*For further information about these matters, please contact the NJSBA Legal Department at (609) 278-5279, or your board attorney for formal legal advice.
