Commissioner of Education
Noteworthy June Decisions
Docket No. 189-26E (June 2, 2026). During spring break, R.Y. – an eighth-grade student who had been disciplined (twice) earlier in the school year – “was implicated in an incident of vandalism of school property.” When the board became aware of R.Y.’s conduct, it “imposed a penalty of forfeiture of eighth-grade privileges, which included participation in Field Day … and graduation ….” Thereafter, petitioner filed an application for emergent relief seeking to have her daughter participate in Field Day and in the graduation ceremony.
Agreeing that graduation is a privilege not a right, the Commissioner of Education (COE) concurred with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief.
Docket No. 190-26 (June 2, 2026). Petitioner is a high school Vice Principal, but previously served as the Principal of a different district high school. After he earned tenure as a Principal, petitioner received two partially effective evaluations. Thereafter, and following petitioner’s request and agreement, the board transferred petitioner to his current Vice Principal position. Petitioner filed a petition and alleged that the board violated his tenure and seniority rights when he was demoted to his current Vice Principal position.
The COE agreed with the ALJ that petitioner knowingly and voluntarily requested a transfer from the position of Principal to Vice Principal and, thereby, relinquished his tenure rights associated with the Principal position. Therefore, the board did not violate petitioner’s tenure or seniority rights in effectuating the voluntary transfer. The COE additionally agreed with the ALJ that petitioner was not constructively discharged from employment as a Principal.
Docket No. 191-26 (June 2, 2026). In 2018, petitioner was a victim of domestic violence and lost her home in Lumberton; shortly thereafter, petitioner moved to emergency assistance housing in Mount Holly. In March 2019, petitioner signed a lease for a property in Mount Holly, which included a provision indicating that the property could be used as “transitional housing” for 24 months. Following receipt of this lease, the board determined that W.A. could continue attending school in Lumberton. In 2023, the board requested verification that petitioner was still residing in transitional housing. Although she signed a transitional housing form indicating that she continued to reside in the Mount Holly property, she did not have an updated lease. In 2025, and after petitioner failed to provide the board with requested information about her housing status, the board determined that petitioner and her family were not homeless; the family resided in Mount Holly; and the children were no longer entitled to attend Lumberton’s schools.
The COE concurred with the ALJ’s determination that petitioner is no longer homeless as defined by the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act; petitioner has established a residence in Mount Holly even if she has expressed desire to move back to Lumberton; the Mount Holly residence is a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and petitioner’s children are no longer eligible to attend Lumberton’s schools.
Docket No. 192-26 (June 2, 2026). Petitioner served as a building and grounds secretary for more than six years, and then was promoted to the position of Assistant Transportation Coordinator (ATC), a twelve-month, non-affiliated position. On April 15, 2025, petitioner was advised that her contract would not be renewed for the 2025-2026 school year because her position was being eliminated due to budgetary constraints. In her petition of appeal, petitioner argued: she was tenured under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, and was entitled to be renewed as an ATC or, alternatively, returned to a secretarial position in the district due to her seniority; the board violated her seniority rights by retaining a non-tenured employee; and she never relinquished her tenure as a secretary when she was promoted to the ATC position.
The COE agreed with the ALJ that the ATC position is not a secretarial or clerical position and, therefore, was not eligible for tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2; agreed that no tenure violation occurred when the board did not renew petitioner’s employment contract for the 2025-2026 school year; agreed with the ALJ that petitioner relinquished her secretarial tenure rights when she voluntarily accepted a promotion from a tenured clerical position to the non-tenurable ATC position; and agreed that petitioner cannot assert now tenure or seniority rights to a clerical position in the district.
Docket No. 193-26 (June 2, 2026). A staff member employed by the board, J.S., was issued a provisional teaching certificate in 2021, which was renewed in 2023 for two years. On January 7, 2025, the State Board of Examiners (SBE) denied his application for a second renewal because he “had exceeded the number of provisional renewals permitted under N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-8.5(c).” In April 2025, J.S. appealed to the SBE, but his appeal was denied in June 2025. Thereafter, the board appealed the SBE’s determination that J.S. failed to meet the requirements for a second renewal of his provisional certificate pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-8.5(c).
The COE concurred with the ALJ that, despite any potential extenuating circumstances which might exist, petitioner’s employee did not meet the criteria established by N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-8.5(c). In the underlying ALJ decision, the ALJ emphasized that the applicable regulation includes no provision granting the SBE discretion to consider extenuating circumstances as grounds for waiving certain certification requirements and, in fact, N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.12(c)(1) explicitly prohibits the SBE from waiving certification requirements.
Docket No. 208-26E (June 18, 2026). Following a vaping incident at an overnight school trip, the district suspended K.R. for three days and prohibited her from participating in the eighth-grade graduation ceremony. As part of its decision, the district noted that petitioner did not comply with the drug testing required by the relevant board policy and K.R. also did not participate in a drug intervention program. Petitioner filed a request for emergent relief to challenge K.R.’s exclusion from the graduation ceremony.
The ALJ denied the request for emergent relief, concluding that petitioner did not meet all the criteria required by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b). The ALJ specifically found that K.R. would not suffer irreparable harm by not walking at the eighth-grade graduation ceremony because she would still advance to ninth-grade and receive her diploma.
Upon review, the COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Docket No. 218-26E (June 24, 2026). During the 2025-2026 school year, A.S., a senior, missed her English class (which is a graduation requirement) 59 times, as well as other classes. A.S. explained that she had to miss class to work to support her family, but the board’s Attendance Review Committee concluded that extenuating circumstances did not exist to excuse the absences. A.S. filed an emergent application to challenge the board’s decisions denying her credit in English, not allowing her to graduate, and excluding her from the graduation ceremony.
Although the ALJ found that A.S. established irreparable harm because a graduation ceremony is a “once in a lifetime event,” the ALJ concluded that A.S. did not meet the other three factors and, therefore, denied her request for emergent relief.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Docket No. 219-26E (June 24, 2026). During the 2025-2026 school year, I.R., a senior, accumulated a significant amount of absences in several classes. The district’s Attendance Review Committee (ARC) considered I.R.’s notes from her therapeutic chiropractor, but because there were no dates or a diagnosis/treatment plan in the notes, the ARC concluded that extenuating circumstances did not exist to waive the attendance requirements for English, Foundations of Graphic Design, and Intro to Visual Arts. Therefore, the district informed I.R. that she could not participate in the graduation ceremony and would have to complete summer school to restore the credits she needed to graduate. Petitioner filed an emergent application to challenge the board’s decisions.
Although the ALJ found that I.R. established irreparable harm because a graduation ceremony is a “once in a lifetime event,” the ALJ concluded that I.R. did not meet the other three factors and, therefore, denied her request for emergent relief.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Docket No. 220-26E (June 24, 2026). The district’s ARC concluded that extenuating circumstances did not exist to waive the credit and attendance requirements for L.E.-K.’s English class, as she had 55 absences. Because L.E.-K.’s absences were far greater than the amount allotted by board regulation (13 absences), the district determined that L.E.-K. did not meet the requirements for a state-endorsed diploma under N.J.A.C. 6A:8-5.1. Petitioner filed an emergent application, seeking her daughter to be permitted to participate in the graduation ceremony and complete online coursework by June 28, 2026.
Although the ALJ found that petitioner demonstrated irreparable harm because a graduation ceremony is a “once in a lifetime event,” the ALJ concluded that petitioner did not meet the other three factors and, therefore, denied her request for emergent relief.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Docket No. 221-26 (June 25, 2026). On August 14, 2025, one of the football coaches reported to the high school administration that A.D., an incoming freshman, stole a scooter from his son and used profane language. Based on this off-campus conduct, the district prohibited A.D. from participating in the fall 2025 football program for violating the district’s Extracurricular Code. Petitioner filed a petition of appeal and sought, among other things, “expungement of the record incident for future participation.”
The ALJ granted the board’s motion for summary decision on the following issues: petitioner was not entitled to procedural due process protections because playing high school football is a privilege; the individual respondents are protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity because there was no violation of a constitutional right; and, with the exception of the expungement request, the remaining relief sought by petitioner failed to state a law subject to the COE’s purview.
However, the ALJ found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether A.D. engaged in a theft and whether the alleged misconduct impacted the safety, security, and well-being of the students, staff, or school grounds. The COE adopted the ALJ’s initial decision, but slightly modified it, directing the hearing judge to additionally consider whether the board followed the procedures in the Extracurricular Code.
Docket No. 225-26 (June 25, 2026). The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioners did not file their appeal within 90 days of the board’s most recent disciplinary determination related to their child and affirmed the dismissal of the petition pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(a).
The COE also explained that, just because petitioners continued communicating with the district after the disciplinary determination, that did not extend their time to appeal. Similarly, the filing deadline is not subject to change based upon petitioners’ legal strategy or a decision to pursue lawsuits in another forum. Finally, the COE noted that, although claims related to their child are “undoubtedly of importance to them as parents, they do not concern broad constitutional issues or matters of significant public interest” and, therefore, relaxation of the 90-day deadline was not warranted.
Docket No. 227-26E (June 25, 2026). The board eliminated all courtesy busing, effective with the 2026-2027 school year. Petitioner, a resident of the district, filed an emergent application, seeking an order compelling the board to reinstate courtesy busing for non-remote students who had previously received transportation under the “hazardous route” designation.
The ALJ denied the request for emergent relief, concluding that petitioner did not demonstrate any of the four prongs required to prevail. The ALJ explained that the board does not have a legal obligation to provide courtesy busing and petitioner did not demonstrate that the board’s decision to eliminate courtesy busing was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
The COE concurred with the ALJ that petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
School Ethics Commission
Decisions Adopted On June 23, 2026
Docket No. C12-24. Pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement, complainant agreed to withdraw the complaint, with prejudice, and respondent agreed to publicly apologize at the next board meeting for interrupting complainant and calling her a liar while she was addressing the public at a “Meet the Candidates” night in 2023. The settlement agreement also provides that “neither party admits liability or wrongdoing in this matter and neither party shall be considered a prevailing party.” The School Ethics Commission (SEC) adopted the ALJ’s initial decision (the settlement agreement) as the final decision.
Docket No. C46-24. Complainants alleged that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d) and (e) when he had a conversation with a food service vendor at the NJSBA convention, inquired about a possible food tasting, and advised that he would be adding a request for proposals to the board’s agenda. Complainants also claimed that respondent was “improperly involved” in the hiring of the director of curriculum in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), (e), and (i).
The SEC adopted the ALJ’s factual findings and legal conclusions that respondent did not violate the Act when he had initial discussions with the food service vendor or when he contacted a principal to encourage him to apply for the superintendent position (for which he did not have the required certificate, and, consequently, applied for the director of curriculum position).
In dismissing the complaint, the SEC also rejected complainants’ argument in their exceptions that C20-20 (where the SEC found a violation of the School Ethics Act (Act) for a board member’s communications with a vendor) was analogous to the within matter.
Docket No. C122-25. Respondents hired a superintendent and approved a three-year contract on May 19, 2025. According to complainant, the superintendent’s previous employer/board conducted an investigation “into multiple unnamed allegations,” and ultimately terminated him. On October 27, 2025, the board extended the superintendent’s contract to a five-year term. Complainant alleged that respondents violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a) and (e) when they: hired the superintendent without seeking “critical information” from the superintendent’s former employer, which potentially compromised the district; and “failed to exercise due diligence” in “reckless[ly]” spending public funds to extend the superintendent’s contract.
The SEC found no probable cause for the stated violations of the Act, but concluded that the complaint was not frivolous.
Docket No. C134-25. Respondent’s nominating petition (Petition) contained the signatures of district employees, including the district’s administrative secretary and the assistant superintendent, which complainant maintained violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), (c), (e), and (f), as well as N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) and (f).
In finding no probable cause for the stated violations of the Act, the SEC emphasized that they have previously addressed (in response to a request for an advisory opinion from complainant) the issue of school administrators signing nominating petitions of board candidates in their district. In that advisory opinion, the SEC concluded that “signing a petition, in their private capacity, as individuals who live in the community, in and of itself, is not enough to present a conflict for” the subject board members and that “it cannot be assumed that [the board members] have or will surrender their independent judgment to the administrators” simply due to the signatures on a nominating petition.
Because respondent was aware of the SEC’s position on this issue through her request for an advisory opinion, the SEC concluded that her complaint was frivolous and fined her $100.
Docket No. C140-25. Complainants alleged that respondent, a principal, violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), (c), and (d) in connection with her investigation of and response to a disciplinary incident involving their child. Because the SEC does not have jurisdiction over student disciplinary investigations, board policies, or the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, the SEC dismissed the complaint in its entirety, but did not find it to be frivolous.
Finally, although complainants did not name the guidance counselor as a respondent, they described her as a “conflicted employee” whom respondent should not have permitted to participate in the investigation. In light of that reference, the SEC also clarified that it does not have jurisdiction over the actions of a guidance counselor because a guidance counselor is not a school official, as defined in the Act.
Docket No. C142-25. Complainant alleged that respondent, the business administrator: failed to provide the required information and documentation regarding McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act funding allocations; improperly charged expenditures related to federal grants to the general fund; and issued energy savings improvement bonds that were incorrectly recorded in the debt service fund, contrary to the New Jersey Department of Education’s Uniform Chart of Accounts requirements. Based on the above conduct, complainant maintained that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a), (b), and (e).
The SEC explained that it does not have jurisdiction over financial regulations or laws, nor does it review complaints, investigations, or decisions involving school audits and/or the failure to correct deficiencies identified in school audits. Accordingly, the SEC dismissed the complaint in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction.
Docket No. C04-26. The New Jersey Department of Education’s Office of Special Education (OSE) substantiated “findings of noncompliance and misrepresentation” against the district.
Complainants asserted that respondent, a board member, did not properly respond to OSE’s findings, and specifically alleged that respondent violated: N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (c), (f), (j).
The SEC explained that it does not have jurisdiction over whether the district or respondent has complied with the findings of OSE and, therefore, dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
Docket No. C05-26 and C27-26 (Consolidated). Respondent, the superintendent, informed complainant that “failure to pick up [her child] within the ‘reasonable time’ may constitute child neglect and may result in notification to New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency.” Complainant argued that respondent’s directive violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a), (b), (c), (d), and (f).
According to complainant, respondent also referred to child neglect “during ongoing special education advocacy and records requests,” which complainant argued violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and (d).
The SEC generally concluded that there were insufficient facts and circumstances to sustain violations of the stated sections of the Act, but declined to find the complaint frivolous.
Docket No. C-06-26. Complainant alleged that the superintendent, assistant superintendent for special services, and supervisor of special services violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) and (f) in connection with various special education matters related to his child (a request for an independent evaluation, a corrective action plan, and transportation policies). Because the SEC does not have jurisdiction over such matters, the SEC dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
Docket No. C-13-26. The superintendent submitted her resignation letter “directly to” respondent, who is the board president, on or about January 12, 2026. However, respondent did not inform the full board of the resignation until executive session at the board meeting on January 20, 2026. Complainant alleged that respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), (c), (e), (g), and (i) because she only shared the resignation with the board vice-president (with instructions to keep the information confidential) and “knowingly and intentionally” withheld the resignation from the remainder of the board “at the direction and for the benefit of outside special-interest groups.”
The SEC determined that there were insufficient facts and circumstances to prove the alleged violations of the Act. The SEC also explained that “determinations regarding when or how to share information regarding the resignation of an administrator is a matter of [b]oard governance, and not governed by the Act,” but noted that “waiting until executive session of the [b]oard meeting following receipt of the letter of resignation does not appear to be unreasonable.”
*For further information about these matters, please contact the NJSBA Legal Department at (609) 278-5279, or your board attorney for formal legal advice.
